On June 24, BM published an article discussing the design of election rules. In this article, we focus on how to get rid of the 28 distribution under the Pareto principle, how to avoid the concentration problems brought about by economies of scale, how to make the distribution of election results more decentralized through mechanism design, and prevent the blockchain network from being controlled by a very small number of people. control?
Evolution of Institutional Design
The core idea of the BM article is: use multiple rules to design to avoid the tendency of centralization caused by a single rule. Will this line of thinking work? What do you think?
There are many issues involved.
The design of governance and the evolution of rules are not easy. It is difficult for us to expect a panacea, and we may not be able to get the desired answer in the short term. Including BM's idea, it is only one of the possible ideas. As one of the representative projects of the governance blockchain (Governance blockchain), the EOS network's governance improvement does not happen overnight.
Seeing the problem, but maintaining patience to find a solution to the problem, often tests the wisdom of the community.
The BM article is a bit long, and I have seen multiple translations. After much deliberation, I no longer do repetitive things, but use a map to list the key issues and ideas in the BM article. To help friends who don't have time to read, there is more or less an idea.
If you are interested in reading the translated version, you can take a look at:
EOS Cannon Translation: Dan's new article: Escape from Pareto Decentralization
Pareto Principle: All kinds of consensus mechanisms are inevitable
PoW mechanism
Bitcoin mining pool concentration:
PoS mechanism (including DPoS mechanism)
Although there may be "21" BPs on a blockchain (such as EOS), they may be produced by a small number of groups.
To sum up, BM believes that whether it is PoW, PoS, or DPoS, it is difficult to avoid Pareto distribution under a single rule.
Problems and Solutions of EOS Blockchain
The BM article talked about the control of EOS by the Asian community.
Two types of problems: Sybil attacks, and economies of scale problems
Sybil attack refers to that even if one vote is set, it may allow cheaters to distribute resources to multiple accounts and then vote.
Economies of scale mean that if an entity controls multiple puppet BPs, then the fixed costs will be reduced, making the cost of bribery lower and more profitable to manipulate BPs.
modeling
When modeling the DPoS mechanism, an extremely conservative assumption is adopted: assuming that the votes obtained by BP are all votes controlled or indirectly controlled by itself, how to avoid the network being monopolized by a single subject?
BM believes that at least 21 different richest subjects should control the top 21, rather than a single subject controlling the top 15.
core idea
After the above discussion, we finally come to the part of solving ideas.
design rules
This part takes a little more time to explain.
BM's idea is to use a grouping method to divide the top 21 BP quotas into four groups, namely 8 + 8 + 3 + 2. Then, each group generates corresponding BP according to different rules.
In the picture above, the rules generated by each are listed. Of course, this part of the rules still needs to be improved and modified, and BM only provides a preliminary original idea of its own.
The different rules are listed separately below.
1. RAM-based voting weight
2. Voting weight based on pledge time (coin age design)
3. Voting weight based on token burning rate/permanent lockup
Here, a destruction rate is assumed, which is a local tyrant’s way of obtaining block qualification: Assuming that it is expected to permanently lock 100,000 EOS, if the time for destruction is shorter, the average destruction rate will be faster, and the corresponding value will be higher. high. (Only for personal understanding, for reference)
I have to say that BM's brain hole is really not small.
4. Current stake-based voting weight
Reward users for not voting
Combination of different rules
voting process
BM envisages adopting the Electoral College system, in which 100 representatives are selected by the network, and then the top 21 are selected by using the permission voting system, one vote for one vote.
The details of this part are lacking, for example, how to let the network select these 100 individuals? How to achieve? Besides complexity, what are the other algorithmic problems?
This part is only listed according to the current article of BM. In the future, if BM continues to adhere to this idea, it will be supplemented.
summary
summary
First of all, in order to avoid misinterpretation by some headline-party media, BM also explained at the end of the article: This content is purely personal opinion, for community reference, and does not represent the views of B1.
Secondly, as mentioned in the article, it is not BM’s whim. Combined with the previous discussions in the telegram group and other places, it can be seen that it has been thought for a long time. However, it is only BM's own opinion, which may not be suitable or correct. The evolution of the governance mechanism is a long process, involving multi-party dynamic games, as well as the migration and evolution of community values, not to mention the differences of ideas between different communities. The exploration of EOS will provide rich precedents and materials for DPoS and even the blockchain industry.
Finally, the core of the BM concept is to use a variety of different rules to balance the Pareto distribution caused by a single rule. Whether it is feasible remains to be tested in theory and practice. Users who are good at mathematical modeling can also follow this idea Do the next simulation, whether you can find something.
Although you may not agree with the several classification methods proposed by BM, you can also start from this idea of multiple combinations and try to conceive different combinations of voting rules in order to improve the security of the EOS network and avoid excessive concentration of voting purposes.
Difficulties in governance cannot be solved overnight. If you eat salty fish to satisfy your thirst, you might as well be more patient.
