Previously translated by the Blockchain Institute, the article produced by the EOS node GreyMass introducing the centralization of inflation in the EOS system has aroused great fanfare, click to read"Staking is so hot, but inflation accelerates and centralizes", originally titled "Inflation, Centralization, and DPoS".

On the basis of the previous problem, the author gives a solution in this article.

In today's EOSIO chain, and even in many blockchain projects using DPoS, the common practice of the system is to use part of the reward as a special fund for improving the system. This is generally achieved through transaction fees generated by on-chain operations or directly through token inflation.

EOSIO-based blockchains are primarily funded through inflation, since general network operations do not require fees. This inflation comes in many forms, either distributed slowly through "block rewards", as part of "worker proposals", or even using genesis "strategic partners" or "development funds".

Regardless of the inflation technique used, they all have the same properties: they add tokens to the overall supply and are given to some entity without a direct exchange of value. This is done with the expectation that these entities will put effort and value into the system.

In this article, we hope to explore new ways to create value for these systems and stimulate discussion of various ways to achieve the same goal.

The EOS mainnet will be the subject of this article, although some of the ideas discussed can easily be applied to other EOSIO-based blockchains.

Note: If you understand the inflation distribution of the EOSIO chain, the development process, and the value that inflation can provide, you can skip the next 3 subsections and go directly to the "Worker Candidates" (similar to "BP Candidates") section to get to know us proposed new system.

1. Expectations for a self-sustaining ecosystem

The ideal goal of a DPoS system such as EOS is to create, encourage and maintain a workforce for the benefit of the network. EOS already has such a collective: Block Producers (BP). BP plays an important role in operating the network and participating in governance. These block producers are paid by the network through inflation.

What most ecosystems of this size have realized is that maintaining the network requires more than a dedicated collective. You need not only block production validators, but individuals and organizations not directly involved in block production and governance who can provide the necessary products and services. The latter does not focus on the control and operation of the blockchain consensus, but instead turns the focus to other important goals for improving the operation of the network.

2. The current inflation status of EOS

Some inflation (reward) events happening within the EOS mainnet are as follows:

• Genesis Rewards:10% of the supply (100 million) is allocated to the b1 account, which is owned by Block.one. This equity is locked for 10 years to motivate Block.one to continue to contribute to the open source EOSIO ecosystem.

• Reward scheme for each block:The system contract itself is designed with an annual inflation rate of 5%, and then further divided into several parts to reward those participants who promote the development of EOS.

Additionally, EOS further funds the network through fees generated from RAM transactions and short account auctions, although these funds do not come from inflation.

In this article, we focus mainly onReward scheme for producing each block。First, we'll understand how it works, and then we'll explore how it can be modified to improve the EOS ecosystem.

3. Current status of block rewards

The reward program per block (5% annual inflation rate) is currently divided into the following areas:

• 80% (of 5%): deposited into eosio.saving account

• 20% (of 5%): Divided into two fund pools as BP rewards:

--- (1%) 25%, also known as bpay: the reward paid to BP for each block produced by BP (the first 21).

--- 75% (of 1%), also known as vpay: Rewards paid to BPs (top 90) based on the percentage of votes they receive.

Through mortgage weight voting, EOS stakeholders ultimately control the 1% inflation, and as long as they pass the vote, this part of the reward will flow to the block producer. Elected block producers are rewarded with newly mined tokens for their services (validating blocks and operating the network).

The remaining 4% inflation accrues to the eosio.saving account and there are differing opinions on how to utilize its value. It has been the subject of debate since the inception of the EOS mainnet, and the EOS accumulated in this savings account since genesis was recently destroyed by BP vote.

Some suggestions for a 4% inflation allocation include:

Worker Proposal System (WPS)

The worker proposal system design is the focus of the discussion for allocating this remaining 4% inflation, but it has yet to really gain traction in terms of adoption on the EOS mainnet.

Although the EOS mainnet lacks a worker proposal system, we have seen a strong desire from the community to have such a system in place. It is currently considered a "non-traditional block producer" entity that is working to become an EOS block producer, with some actually becoming active producers, taking one of the 21 seats on consensus issues.

Many of these entities act this way because the system does not offer them other options, and stakeholders vote for them because they see value in the non-block producer role they play. The problem then becomes this: there are unenthusiastic and unqualified entities in the governance system to act as block producers who end up with partial control over the consensus and will be more willing and able to act as block producers Other entities are excluded.

Worker proposals can alleviate this by creating another opportunity, but these systems are complex to build and ultimately time-consuming for stakeholders involved in voting and entities applying for funding.

Voting Incentives (Staking Rewards)

Another popular suggestion for how these funds might be spent is to create incentives for voting participation. The system will generate what is traditionally called a “staking reward” for token holders who stake their tokens and then participate in the voting process either through proxies or by voting for certain block producers.

This proposal goes beyond what REX offers in its implementation, as REX also requires you to rent out your tokens to earn rewards. Users who are willing to stake and use the network resources provided by these tokens are not included in the rewards of REX.

Unfortunately, voting incentives do not solve the problem of rewarding workers, so we will discuss this topic later.

completely remove inflation

Aside from finding a use case for this kind of inflation - there's even been a discussion lately about whether it's just about destroying that money and canceling out that part of the inflation. Although the EOS of the eosio.saving account has been destroyed recently, the funds have not been canceled and continue to be deposited in this account.

We supported the latest burn because we felt that having such a large amount of money without an effective plan to allocate it could create potential conflicts. However, we’d rather choose to find a use for this inflation than eliminate it entirely, avoiding the issues we raised in our Inflation, Centralization, and DPoS article.

With the above understanding, we should return to the focus of the article discussion:How to use this inflation to fund important participants in the network who are not acting as block producers.Next, it's time for worker proposals to come on the scene.

4. Worker candidates

"Worker Candidates" (similar to "Block Producer Candidates").

Instead of using a proposal system, what if a system of per-block rewards that mimics the existing BP election system is chosen?

This approach uses a system that is already in operation today, but also selects a set of "workers" who don't do things that block producers are responsible for.These "workers" can be individuals, entire organizations (such as BPs), or smart contracts with a clear purpose.These entities work hard to prove their worth, as BP has done, and stakeholders can decide who to choose into the workforce.

The system itself creates a pool of worker rewards as it has been applied to block producers through a fixed fraction of total inflation (a proportion deemed appropriate by stakeholders). Selected workers are then able to claim rewards as BPs do today.

On a technical level, the system might work like "reward per vote" (vpay, short for "vote pay"), rewarding workers based on the number of votes they The same people as block producers vote for elections.

IMPORTANT NOTE: We stress here that this discussion is focused on creating new reward pools, not determining the overall inflation rate.

An already familiar design can be adopted by changing the inflation rate we mentioned above:

(5.0%) 50%: deposited into eosio.saving account

30% (of 5.0%): Paid to workers based on the percentage of votes they receive

(5.0%) 20%: Divided into two reward pools as rewards for Block Producers

--- 25% (of 1.0%), also known as bpay: Paid to block producers (top 21 only) for each block they produce.

--- 75% (of 1.0%), also known as vpay: paid to block producers (top 90 only) based on the percentage of votes they received.

This brings two main changes:

A newly elected group of "workers" provides value to the network. Reallocate 1.5% of the future inflation of the eosio.saving account (or 30% of the overall inflation) into the worker reward pool.

As mentioned in the previous article "Inflation, Centralization, and DPoS", the ratio between block producers and non-block producers should be properly coordinated to promote decentralization or at least prevent the trend of centralization. The numbers in the above example were chosen such that the total amount of worker funds (1.5%) is greater than the total amount of block producer funds (1.0%), thereby avoiding the concentration of power among parties controlling consensus. In reality, these two numbers could be higher or lower - as long as the entire worker fund is equal to or greater than the block producer's fund.

5. Worker candidate election

Like block producers, worker candidates can be elected in real-time, allowing stakeholders to control all inflation releases. These ongoing elections will facilitate competition to become worker candidates, similar to what block producers do, encouraging the best candidates to move into higher ranked positions.

It also simplifies the system for stakeholders and potential candidates compared to the traditional 'worker proposal system'. Candidates don't need to submit specific proposals or set timelines - they simply present themselves with what they have to offer in an effort to bring the community together.

As these entities provide value, stakeholders will vote for them. If these entities fail to provide value, then voters can decide to cancel their vote and no longer support the candidate. The voter participation process is also simplified, as voters choose to support specific entities, rather than reviewing proposals on a project-by-project basis.

This design creates the same expectations for the work that block producers do, and faces the same challenges that block producers already face.

Behind these scenarios, worker candidates will work much like block producers - requiring a minimum number of votes to claim rewards. Stakeholders can modify minimum votes, overall inflation, and other requirements by exerting pressure on block producers who ultimately control all system contracts. These numbers can be fine-tuned to increase or decrease the number of worker candidates the system can support.

6. The candidate should be unique

It is important that individual entities do not participate as workers and BPs. This can only be enforced by voters, but we strongly recommend that the EOS community develop strong social norms around this idea. Block producers are expected to only run one candidate, and workers should only be allowed (voters) to run one candidate.

This ideal situation should exist among two selected teams of various entities, and each entity should have only one BP candidate or one worker candidate.In the absence of multiples of one type, entities should exist either only as workers or only as block producers.

Even though this concept has proven to be unenforceable in the current system, we felt it was still an important concept to pass on to stakeholders. The reason for this is that multiple candidatures will bring concentration of power; any entity running multiple candidates will be duplicating compensation, which may further solidify their position of receiving multiple rewards.As we argued in our Inflation, Centralization, and DPoS article, this will lead to a single entity accumulating greater power in the network over the long run.

Achieving this goal requires full transparency from these new workers and block producers. Ownership disclosure for worker entities is as important as ownership disclosure for BPs to ensure we know who is behind worker entities and who will benefit from rewards earned.

Fortunately, we have a good start on how to achieve this, and that is by using techniques that some block producers already use on-chain and on their sites, like a standardized "worker message" that defines what constitutes an organization. "JSON entry. In the end, as with block producers, it will be up to stakeholders to decide how to manage worker candidates.

7. Who will be the candidates?

We imagine these candidates will consist primarily of the groups you see in EOS today, currently existing as organizations and/or block producers. These worker candidates will actively add value to EOS while not expecting or having the ability to be responsible block producers.

Take the Scatter team as an example, a company that provides incredible value to the EOS ecosystem with the sole mission of developing the Scatter product suite and powering various dApps. If as a stakeholder you agree that the EOS network should support Scatter, then you can vote for them to be a worker candidate.

If elected, they will be rewarded from this new reward pool without the need to submit specific worker proposals or assume infrastructure and governance responsibilities as block producers. They can then be selected by stakeholders to do what they do best and nothing more.

Organizations like the Scatter team can also do without this kind of support from the EOS network. Once an entity has established its own successful business model, then it can exit its worker candidate status and continue to serve the network while remaining independent.

Another excellent example as a worker candidate are various DAO/DAC schemes like EOS DAO

(https://medium.com/eos-new-york/the-eos-dao-progress-on-chain-99fc4a47e4ac)。

Decentralized organizations like this provide unique value to the network through various initiatives where ample funding is available to support their organization and fund external projects that align with their goals.These goals can be funding development, infrastructure, protocols, or even incubating and helping to guide new projects. Just having a system of worker candidates allows these organizations to grow and bring value to the ecosystem.

Worker candidates are also an option for current block producers who would rather focus on their product and not have to deal with governance and consensus issues. It can also come to the rescue of block producers who end up in a situation where they develop a product or service that creates a conflict of interest, perhaps because their business decisions conflict with those of the network. These Block Producers now have the opportunity to transition from Block Producer Candidates to Worker Candidates, relinquish their rights in governance and consensus, and focus on their business.

media

exchange

media

Developer

infrastructure provider

infrastructure provider

Community/Outreach

Any non-BP entity that adds value to the ecosystem in the eyes of stakeholders should be eligible as a worker candidate.

8. Will it affect BP?

Will - hopefully in a positive way. Not only does this give some block producers an opportunity to get rid of technical requirements and governance decisions, but it also makes room for candidates who would like to do so by kicking out entities that end up being elected block producers and refusing to actively vote or participate in governance. out of place.

Simply introducing worker candidates into the ecosystem provides a clearer understanding of the roles and responsibilities of these two distinct elected groups:

• The most important task of a BP candidate is to ensure the normal operation of the blockchain, and all other projects are secondary.

• A worker candidate's first priority is to add value to the blockchain through products and services.

That’s not to say BP candidates can’t also stay competitive by adding value to the blockchain with products and services, but when the blockchain itself is the center of gravity, it’s their responsibility to drop all other activities. This clear delineation of responsibilities sets a precedent that block producers’ primary task is to act in the interests of the network and exist as stewards.

9. Impact on related proposals

Impact on other proposals involving fees and inflation.

The introduction of worker candidate reward pools from a portion of inflation is not meant to replace any type of proposal/approval system or governance body, nor should it discredit any other proposal that attempts to use inflation to achieve other goals.

Currently, EOS has two reward pools for fund inflow through inflation, which are eosio.saving account and EOS node.

This proposal would add a 3rd rewards pool, but that doesn't mean a 4th, 5th or 6th pool can't exist and operate entirely outside of the system. For example, Steem inflation is divided into 4 pools, such a system tends to be decentralized over time due to the participation of various parties.

This worker candidate reward pool is intended to be an inflation pool dedicated to rewarding (via inflation) the very important non-block producers we can attract.

10. Conclusion

We believe that there is a relative force that is critical for a system like EOS in terms of inflation distribution.Rewarding workers is a reasonable measure to achieve this, and adds a system that provides a second source of inflation to counter the current single source of inflation (BP rewards).

Introducing "worker candidates" and leveraging systems familiar to EOS stakeholders is one of many options to achieve this, and we believe it is one of the easiest implementations to achieve in the short term.

If the stakeholders of the EOS mainnet can accept this idea - we are willing to make an effort to further clarify this concept and help realize this proposal. If not, at least we hope to provide a way to be open to thinking about how to use inflation to drive the network to better achieve some kind of balance.

We recognize that this idea has both enormous potential and serious risks. We hope to discuss with the community the pros, cons and tradeoffs of such a system. As we see more EOSIO-based blockchain projects launch in the future, this framework may help them think about how to fund their systems and how to make their blockchains more competitive.

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Author: GreyMass, EOS node

Disclaimer: This article is the author's independent point of view, and does not represent the position of the Blockchain Institute, nor does it constitute any investment opinion or suggestion.

Disclaimer: This article is the author's independent point of view, and does not represent the position of the Blockchain Institute, nor does it constitute any investment opinion or suggestion.

Original link: https://blog.greymass.com/eos/@greymass/a-simple-system-to-support-blockchain-workers-in-dpos