Author of this article:Jiang ZhuoerJiang Zhuoer
, Original link: https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404305777891366168#_0
secondary title
1. Why can computing power become the highest arbitration mechanism for Bitcoin?
The answer is simple: because computing power can kill a chain.
This is a bottom-line rule: Survival is the ultimate form of debate, the highest basis for deciding right from wrong. There are many ways to express this rule, such as "the king loses the king", "the truth is only within the range of the cannon", "violence is the meta-rule that determines all rules".
Why is atheism (Scientology) right? Is it because atheism can argue against theism? Of course not, the logical foundations of atheism and theism are not consistent, and the argument is like chicken and duck. Atheism is right not because it is more "reasonable" but because it makes guns.
I can create a gun to destroy you, you don't exist anymore, what qualifications do you have to discuss right and wrong?
Therefore, survival is the ultimate way of debate and the highest basis for deciding right or wrong. Why do I support "evolution" and not "stability"? Because the "evolution theory" has the sole purpose of adapting to market demand and increasing the number of users, while the "stability theory" does not take this as the highest goal.
Of course, the "stability theory" will think that my chain protocol is stable, so users will choose me, but what if it is not? What if the two contradict each other?
What if functions like DSV are added according to market needs, so as to attract more users than when it was stable, and first reach the ultimate goal of 5 billion? So who is right and who is wrong?
Therefore, "evolution theory" is logically self-consistent. Extreme lock-in and over-modification are both wrong, Evolutionary is more likely to find the sweet spot in "stable" and "modified", and get the most users.
Some people may think: "The product needs to attract more users, and the currency cannot be designed in this way", "BCH should develop well on the currency, and should not engage in various new functions and second-layer networks." This is wrong, currency is also a kind of product, and the U.S. dollar also faces competition from the euro, renminbi, and yen. Why does the U.S. government develop "petrodollars" (international oil trade is settled in U.S. dollars)? It's not about "applications" and "users" for increasing dollars.
In the field of encrypted digital currency, this kind of product competition is even more intense: any kind of currency must face the competition of a large number of currencies (products).
secondary title
2. How to kill a chain through computing power?
Going back to the computing power war, the computing power war is a dragon-slaying skill that has never been used by most people, so there are many mistakes in various articles and speculations. Libit Mining Pool (BTC.TOP) is the only mining pool on the entire network that has experience in large-scale computing power warfare. Any statement that is inconsistent with this article (including CSW's statement) is an error.
Everyone knows the "51% computing power attack":
1. The attacker uses the superior computing power to mine an attack chain longer than the original chain.
PS: The "longer chain" here is precisely the "chain with greater cumulative difficulty". For example, a node will accept 2 blocks with a difficulty of 10 and discard 3 blocks with a difficulty of 5, because 10+10=20 >15=5+5+5. For the convenience of description, it is assumed that the difficulty of each block is the same in the following text.
Through 51% attacks, various purposes can be achieved, such as:
1. After Tx1 (transaction 1) is confirmed, cancel Tx1 and let another conflicting Tx2 (transaction 2) take effect.
1. After Tx1 (transaction 1) is confirmed, cancel Tx1 and let another conflicting Tx2 (transaction 2) take effect.
2. Use the blocks dug by yourself (red blocks) to isolate the blocks dug by other miners (blue blocks), so that other miners will lose mining output.
For example, Alice uses Tx1 to send 1 BTC to Bob, and exchanges 100 LTC with Bob. After receiving Bob’s 100 LTC, she uses Tx2 to send the 1 BTC to herself, replacing Tx1, and pays 1 BTC to Bob. Take back.
On the basis of the 51% computing power attack, a "51% empty block attack" can be carried out: the attacker only digs out empty blocks (blocks not including any transactions), and does not accept (isolate) any other miners, and pack them normally The block of the transaction paralyzes the chain, and no one can trade normally.
Moreover, since the blocks dug by miners on this chain are isolated and there is no mining income, mining will gradually stop, and finally this chain will die.
secondary title
The defender needs not to recognize the attack chain, mobilize more computing power after the original covered chain, and mine a longer chain than the attacker
In actual offense and defense, both parties will continue to extend their own chains, and may reorganize coverage back and forth. That is to say, a neutral node that only accepts the longest chain according to the default rules may accept the attack chain when the attack chain is long, and then abandon the attack chain and accept the defense chain when the defense chain is long.
secondary title
4. Cost analysis of both offensive and defensive sides
The winning side only needs to mine one more block than the losing side.
1. If the defender gives up, the attacker does not need to continue to spend the cost to dig blocks, as long as the mining is simply stopped, the chain will die. Afterwards, if the attacker finds that the defender starts digging blocks again, the attacker only needs to continue digging one more block than the defender.
2. If the attacker gives up, the situation is a bit different, the attacker will still lose all mined blocks (and cost), but since the chain is still alive, the defender can get the previously mined blocks as income.
That is to say, regardless of whether the attacker wins or loses, the attacking party will inevitably lose the attack cost, while the defending party has a defensive advantage, and if it wins, it can also obtain mining income as compensation.
secondary title
5. Analysis of computing power of both offensive and defensive sides
On November 15th, the ABC client of BCH upgraded the hard fork to version 0.18.2, and Bitmain supports this upgrade of ABC.
The BSV client supported by CSW will fork out the BSV chain at the same time, and claim that it will attack the ABC 0.18.2 chain (upgrade chain) and kill the ABC upgrade chain.
5.1. The computing power of CSW:
The mining pools that support CSW (Coingeek, svpool, BMG, etc.) currently display a computing power of about 2000-3000P. CSW claims to have hidden computing power, so it can be considered that CSW has at least 3000P of its own computing power.
CSW can also control more computing power through leasing, such as negotiating computing power leasing with mining pools and large mines, or renting computing power from computing power platforms such as nicehash, as long as they are willing to give a premium (such as +20% mining income), CSW’s own + leased computing power reaches 10,000 P, which is not difficult.
5.2. The computing power of Bitmain:
Bitmain’s mining pools (BTC.com and Antpool) have a total computing power of about 15,000P, and together with the ViaBTC mining pool in which Bitmain is a shareholder, it has a total computing power of about 20,000P.
Since both BTC and BCH use the sha256 algorithm for mining, technically, the mining pool can switch back and forth between BTC and BCH in seconds. As long as the miners are normally paid the BTC produced by mining according to the computing power, the miners actually don't care what coins are actually mined. The miners don't even know what coins they are mining, they just answer the calculation tasks issued by the mining pool. Therefore, if Bitmain is willing, it can use all 200 million P of BTC computing power to defend on BCH. There have been various rumors before, such as Bitmain deploying 90,000 mining machines in Xinjiang for computing power wars, etc., which are meaningless rumors. Bitmain uses BTC computing power for computing power warfare, which is in line with the principle of computing power warfare that "survival is the ultimate debate method".
Since Bitmain is at a critical stage of listing, CSW threatened that if Bitmain uses BTC computing power to carry out a computing power war, he will attack Bitmain through litigation. But this approach is of little significance, because Bitmain basically does not need to use all 20,000P computing power to fight. If part of the computing power is used, Bitmain can declare to use its own computing power (or partner computing power), and the rest (normally get paid BTC) miners have no incentive to sue, and it is difficult to confirm what coins they are mining.
Although the computing power of Bitmain is basically more than that of CSW, the victory or defeat of the computing power war does not only depend on the computing power. If CSW goes to war with all its strength as claimed before, tens of millions or even hundreds of millions of costs will be burned every day. The bottleneck of the computing power war will not be computing power, but the funds that both sides are willing to burn.
In terms of money, CSW claims to be a billionaire, with a luxury house and a car, and has the full support of Calvin Ayre (gaming industry tycoon). Bitmain is a behemoth with a valuation of 15 billion US dollars, which is being listed, and holds more than 1 million BCH, and has enough interests in BCH. Both sides are heavyweight players. As for how much money both sides are willing to burn, it depends on the will of both parties, and we cannot guess.
secondary title
6. Analysis of the proportion of money burned by both offensive and defensive sides
The normal computing power of BCH depends on: the total computing power of BTC & the exchange rate of BCH/BTC. For example, the total computing power of BTC on November 2 is 51370P, and the exchange rate of BCH/BTC=0.067, then the normal computing power of BCH should be 51370*0.067=3441P. If the actual BCH computing power is higher than 3441P, the output of each mining machine mining BCH will be lower than BTC, and the miners will migrate from BCH to BTC until the mining income on both sides is the same, and vice versa.
The amount of computing power invested by CSW will determine the proportion of money burned by both parties.
6.1. If CSW invests 7000P computing power (twice the normal computing power of BCH)
As mentioned in Chapter 4, regardless of whether the attacker wins or loses, the attacker will inevitably lose the attack cost, while the defender has a defensive advantage, and if he wins, he can get mining income as compensation. Therefore, if Bitmain also invests 7000P computing power in defense and wins in the end, it can get the BCH mined during the BCH period as compensation (equivalent to the cost of 3500P computing power).
That is to say, when the computing power battle burns money, Bitmain invests 7000P computing power in defense, but only 3500P of it needs to be burned, and the remaining 3500P will get normal mining output (although it cannot be cashed out temporarily), while CSW’s 7000P computing power is all All need to burn money.
Therefore, the less computing power CSW invests, the greater the "defensive deduction advantage" of Bitmain. For example, when each invests 5000P, Bitmain burns 1500P vs. CSW 5000P. Therefore, Bitmain's determination to persist to the end must also be greater .
6.2. If CSW invests 7000~14000P computing power
At this time, it will not be the computing power of both parties that will determine the outcome, but the will to burn money of both parties. For example, if CSW invests 10000P vs. Bitmain 10000P, then Bitmain's "defensive deduction advantage" will not be obvious. After the deduction, it will become CSW 10000P burning vs. Bitmain 6500P burning.
And after the two sides transfer a large amount of BTC computing power (assuming a total of 20,000P) to BCH to plan a power war, the rental cost per P of computing power will be greatly increased:
a. BTC transaction packaging fee will be greatly increased
Since the block size of BTC is locked to 1M by Core, therefore: 40% reduction in computing power → 40% reduction in block production speed → 1 1M block per 10 minutes becomes 0.6 blocks per 10 minutes = 0.6M block → BTC is the same as at the end of 2017, with super congestion → BTC transaction packaging fee will be increased to 20-30% → The cost of computing power per P will increase by 20-30%
b. The output of BTC computing power per P will be greatly increased
At present, the daily output of 20,000P computing power is 30 million yuan, and the cost of the later stage of the computing power war may rise to 50 million yuan/day or more. If CSW goes all out to carry out the computing power war as claimed before, then the computing power war will burn money at an extremely fast speed. Won't last long.
6.3. Summary: The outcome of the computing power war depends on the combined influence of computing power and funds. The less computing power of CSW, the greater the financial advantage needed; the greater the computing power, the smaller the financial advantage required. If CSW has a huge financial advantage, even with a computing power of 4000P, it can win the computing power war and force Bitmain to give up its defense.
secondary title
7. Frontal battle & guerrilla warfare in computing power war
From chapters 2 to 6, the "computing power war aimed at killing a chain" is expounded: starting from the bifurcation point, both attackers and defenders continue to dig blocks on their own chains until one party abandons its entire chain.
This kind of "computing power frontal war" is similar to the frontal war between countries, with the purpose of destroying the country. The frontal war costs a lot of money, lasts for a short time, and causes little damage to non-military targets.
Corresponding to this is "computing power guerrilla warfare": the attacker does not carry out a frontal confrontation due to insufficient strength or will, instead of continuously digging the attack chain, but scattered and occasional attacks, so the attack cost is low, but the duration long. Every time the attack chain covers the original chain briefly, it must be covered by the defender again, which can only affect the stability of the chain, but cannot kill a chain.
The difference between "frontal warfare" and "guerrilla warfare" can be summarized as follows:
As mentioned in the "top" and "middle" of this article, the purpose of computing power voting (computing power war) is to serve as the final arbitration method to avoid unnecessary forks when the goals of both parties are the same, but the means are not consistent. Only "frontal warfare" has the effect of "eliminating a chain to avoid forks", while "guerrilla warfare" does not have this effect. Therefore, "guerrilla warfare" has no meaning other than prolonging the time of computing power warfare and causing damage to the ecology.
secondary title
8. Results of the computing power battle
The possible evolution path of computing power warfare is as follows:
Scenario A: Bitmain’s defense is successful, but CSW attack fails
CSW has always claimed in its propaganda that it "intends to fight hard" and "has no division". After the failure of the CSW computing power war, if CSW fulfills its promise and abandons the BSV chain, the computing power war ends, the ABC chain becomes BCH, and the BSV chain dies [flow chart, result 2]
But then CSW claimed that "it will take two years" and "to make BCH have no transactions" (see CSW's letter to Roger Ver after Roger Ver announced that his Bitcoin.com supported ABC)
If CSW fails in the frontal battle (even unwilling to burn money to fight the frontal battle), it continues to fight a "guerrilla war" that cannot kill a chain and prevent splitting, and at the same time, the BSV chain continues to dig blocks, forming a long-term coexistence in fact, ABC If there are two split chains with BSV [flow chart, result 1], then CSW will violate its promise of "no split" and be abandoned by most of the community.
CSW's long-term guerrilla warfare will cause the BCH chain to be in an unstable state for a long time. The exchange may not resume the deposit and withdrawal of BCH for a long time, and the merchants may be unwilling to accept BCH for a long time, which is what CSW called "2 years of no trade (no transaction for two years)", "welcome to bankruptcy (welcome to bankruptcy)". This is not in the interest of everyone in the BCH community.
If the BCH community cannot prevent CSW from going its own way and engaging in guerrilla warfare for a long time, then:
a. The mining pool on BCH needs to establish an automatic defense system that cooperates with each other. When CSW's computing power is mining normally, it accepts the blocks dug out by it; when it detects the attack chain of the isolated original chain block, it does not accept the attack chain. , but after the original chain block, automatically mobilize computing power to mine until the attack chain of CSW is covered.
b. However, during the period when the defensive computing power covers the attack chain (maybe a few minutes to several hours, depending on the length of the attack chain, the longer the attack chain, the longer the recovery time required), the BCH chain will temporarily not be able to confirm the transaction , users will also see transactions that were recently confirmed, become unconfirmed again, or destabilize the chain.
Therefore, the best way is for the ABC development team to issue a temporary wartime patch, which only accepts reorganized chains with height = 1 at most (common orphan blocks), and does not accept any reorganized chains with height >= 2, so that the attacker can only be isolated at most The latest 1 block (rollback 1 confirmed transaction), the recovery time is also very short, and will not pose a threat to exchanges and merchants.
However, the consequence of this patch is that the mining pool must be more vigilant during the patch period to avoid continuous isolated blocks with a height >= 2 due to some network reasons, because this will lead to permanent forks of different mining pools. If such a fork occurs unexpectedly, the mining pool must immediately coordinate with each other, abandon the shorter forked chain, and unify to the longest chain.
Case B: CSW attack is successful, Bitmain gives up defense
As analyzed in 6.2, if CSW burns more than Bitmain can afford, Bitmain will be forced to give up defense. If the ABC development team abandons the ABC chain and accepts the BSV chain, or does not accept the BSV chain but withdraws from the BCH development, the computing power war will end, the ABC chain will die (no one continues to mine), and the BSV chain will become BCH [flow chart, result 3].
This is the worst case scenario, the BCH community will undergo a huge split, BCH will be greatly weakened, and BSV will inherit the goal that BCH gave up-challenge BTC and become the real Bitcoin.
No matter what the final result is, this battle of computing power will demonstrate the role and power of computing power, significantly improve the status of computing power in the entire ecology, and pave the way for computing power as the final means of adjudication of Bitcoin disagreements. BTC, BCH, BSV and many other split currencies with the same algorithm may all be unified in the end.
secondary title
9. User Suggestions During the Computing Power War
1. If you do not plan to buy or sell BCH during the computing power war, simply keep your private key safe.
2. If you plan to buy or sell BCH during the hash war, please read this article carefully about the principles and procedures of the hash war attack and defense, and ignore any statement that contradicts this article. For the price changes of ABC and BSV during the computing power war, please consult God (my consistent point of view: the currency price asks the number of users in the long term, and asks God in the short term).
3. CSW has been confusing "a transaction can be packaged on both chains" and "only one chain exists, no split" these two irrelevant things (probably because CSW supporters oppose the split of BCH into two coins ?). At the beginning of the computing power war, as long as there is the slightest inconsistency between the ABC and BSV chains (for example, the ABC chain packs a transaction with a DSV operation code), then the ABC and BSV chains will physically fork into two chains. There is "only one chain", CSW can only kill the ABC chain at most, so that only one of the two chains survives.
After the split of the ABC and BSV chains, since CSW does not add replay protection on the BSV chain, a situation similar to that of the previous ETH and ETC forks will occur (when ETH is sent, ETC with the same address is sent together). When you send ABC coins, since the transaction you send ABC can also be packaged on the BSV chain, it is very likely that you will also send BSV coins. If you don't know how to separate, you need to send the coins to the exchange with the same recharge address for BCH and BSV to avoid losing coins.
4. Charge the coins to the exchange (promised to the two currencies) before the computing power war. The advantage is that it can still be traded during the computing power war, and if there is a fork, the exchange will help you separate the two currencies. The downside is when you can charge and withdraw, you have to completely listen to the exchange. If the computing power war lasts for a long time (especially if CSW fights guerrilla warfare for a long time), the exchange may not open deposits and withdrawals for a long time. Plus, any exchange is at risk of going out of business.
5. Keep the currency on the chain and control the private key yourself. The disadvantage is that you cannot trade during the computing power war. The advantage is that you control your own currency. After the computing power war, you can choose the exchange that resumes deposit and withdrawal first. Both approaches have their pros and cons, and you can choose according to your own situation and needs.
I support computing power voting (computing power war), and believe that BCH should take user acquisition as the highest goal, evolve rapidly, and use computing power voting (computing power war) to eliminate differences in evolution and prevent unnecessary forks.
The computing power of Libit Mining Pool (BTC.TOP) will support the party who is willing to invest more computing power and funds, and help this party to end the chaotic situation of computing power war as soon as possible and restore the order of the BCH blockchain.
secondary title
10. Summary
1. Survival is the ultimate way of debate and the highest basis for deciding right or wrong. Computing power can kill a chain, so computing power can become the highest arbitration mechanism for Bitcoin.
2. The "51% empty block attack" can prevent any transaction from being packaged and confirmed on a chain, and after the miners fail to dig any blocks, they will gradually stop mining, and finally the chain will die.
3. To defend against "51% empty block attack", it is necessary to stick to the original chain, mobilize more computing power, dig a longer chain than the attacker, and in turn cover the attack chain back.
4. The defender has mining output as a "defensive deduction advantage". The greater the attacker's computing power, the smaller the deduction advantage of the defender, and the smaller the financial advantage required by the attacker. Conversely, the greater the attacker's financial advantage, the less computing power is required.
5. Bitmain can use the computing power of BTC for the BCH computing power battle, so the computing power is more than that of CSW. CSW must have a financial advantage and a stronger will to burn money in order to win.
6. "Computing power guerrilla warfare" cannot achieve the ultimate goal of computing power warfare: killing a chain. "Hash power guerrilla warfare" has no meaning except to prolong the time of computing power war and cause damage to the ecology.
